Sparrow therapeutics exit strategy by Kamuriwo, D. S. & Baden-Fuller, C.
Kamuriwo, D. & Baden-Fuller, C. (2014). Sparrow therapeutics exit strategy. Entrepreneurship: 
Theory and Practice, 38(3), pp. 691-708. doi: 10.1111/etap.12003 
City Research Online
Original citation: Kamuriwo, D. & Baden-Fuller, C. (2014). Sparrow therapeutics exit strategy. 
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 38(3), pp. 691-708. doi: 10.1111/etap.12003 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/14001/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 Sparrow Therapeutics Exit Strategy 
 
 
Dr. Dzidziso Samuel Kamuriwo 
& 
Professor Charles Baden-fuller 
 
Sir John Cass Business School 
City University of London 
106 Bunhill Row 
EC1Y 8TZ 
London, United Kingdom 
T: 0044 207 040 8689 
F: 0044 207 040 8328 
Email: d.s.kamuriwo@city.ac.uk 
c.baden-fuller@city.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
The authors want to thank the management team of the company for giving them access to the 
company and allowing the case to be used for academic teaching and research purposes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2 
Sparrow Therapeutics exit strategy 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The case focuses on Ken Powers, co-founder and CEO of Sparrow Therapeutics, whose young 
biotechnology company has reached a critical stage where he has to decide whether or not to sell. The 
company’s three main sets of investors have different priorities: (1) a quick cash sale now (2) delay 
sale for about a year if returns are greater and (3) delay sale for two years, build company value and 
retain autonomy. What choice would be best for the company, for its investors and – and for Ken 
himself? And when would be the best time to implement the exit strategy? 
  
 
3 
Introduction 
It’s June 2006, and Ken Powers, Chief Executive Officer of Sparrow Therapeutics, is facing a 
difficult Board meeting. His successful young biotech company has reached a critical stage 
where he has to decide whether or not to sell up. Ken knows the decision cannot be based 
solely on his personal goals - he has to consider what Sparrow’s different investors want. Ken 
co-founded Sparrow as a university spin-out back in 1998 with a talented group of colleagues 
supported by an initial group of business angels1. Now Sparrow has blossomed into one of 
the UK’s most promising small biotechnology companies, thanks in part to a lot of cash it 
received from venture capital (VC) investors. But – even given the expertise of Ken and his 
co-founders, and the exciting new techniques they are bringing to their work - drug discovery 
is a long and expensive business, and Ken has had to divert some of his energies to another 
round of fundraising from a second group of VC investors to keep Sparrow in development 
cash – but at the cost of jettisoning one whole stream of promising science. Now Sparrow’s 
board – where these two groups of venture capital investors dominate the voice of the early 
founder/angel group - has been pushing Ken to propose an exit strategy2 that satisfies all their 
interests.  
But it’s not a simple matter – for the three groups all want different things. Over the 
past year, Ken has sought advice from consultants, investment bankers and brokers about 
various exit options. Ken could sell the firm now – in fact, a major pharmaceutical company 
has put a cash offer on the table. Ken can see this would suit the ‘first round’ VC investors, 
who have been with the company since 2000 and who need to cash in now. Of all the 
investors, this group is the most worrisome – and the most vocal: facing pressure from their 
                                                 
1
 Business angels are wealthy entrepreneurial individuals who invest cash in new companies in return for a 
owning part of the business 
2
 Ways investors can recoup the capital thay have invested in the company 
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own investors, they want their cash back as quickly as possible, regardless of whether the 
terms of any agreement Sparrow has to sign are acceptable to other investors.  
Ken can also propose to take the company public via an initial public offering (IPO)3 
and a stock exchange listing, so shareholders can dispose of their shares on the public market, 
which will provide enough cash to replace their investment (and, ideally, more). There will 
be a delay of at least a year before investors get their cash back as Ken plans for the IPO, but 
Ken believes the main interest of those ‘second round’ VCs who invested in Sparrow only 
recently is to maximize the value of their investment, so they might be open to the idea of 
their exit being delayed – within reason. But he knows this group needs to be convinced 
Sparrow’s value will continue to increase if they are to agree to take a longer term view of its 
future - and this means the products in Sparrow’s development pipeline must be matured by 
at least one more stage.  
Ken can also try to convince the board to keep their money in and put in some more - 
carry on their support in building up the company, increasing its value and consider the 
situation again in two years time. He knows there is no way he can please everyone - each 
option will satisfy one group and frustrate the others. And for Ken himself it isn’t obvious 
either: he’s put a lot of hope, skill and effort into Sparrow and he wants to be sure that a) the 
company’s identity is maintained, either by it remaining an independent concern or (if part of 
a larger outfit) having sufficient scientific autonomy to continue its work; b) there’s going to 
be enough cash to allow Sparrow to go on developing products so he can realize his long held 
goal of bringing its technologies to market; but at the same time c) that his investors – 
especially his co-founders and business angels (and he himself) – get a decent return for their 
investment and for their loyalty.  
                                                 
3
 An Initial Public Offering when a company issues shares for sale to the general public for the first time.  
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So – sell out now and risk being gobbled up in a huge conglomerate? Go public, and 
hope to find the money to keep going and stay in control of Sparrow’s destiny? Persuade his 
current investors to stay with Sparrow, to buy him time to build its value up? Which is best 
for Sparrow – and for Ken himself? And can he even be sure these were the only options? 
What is he going to tell his Board tomorrow?  
 
Background 
Ken co-founded Sparrow Therapeutics with the help of talented colleagues and some 
business angels in 1998. Ken’s exceptional credentials included international renown for his 
work as a virologist4 and extensive prior experience in the pharmaceutical industry, having 
been Head of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)’s infectious diseases research division for a number of 
years. On leaving GSK, he joined University College London (UCL) as Professor in the 
Virology Research Institute, where he had founded and managed two other successful 
biotechnology companies before Sparrow. Four of Ken’s scientific co-founders were also 
prominent scientists in complementary drug discovery and development fields (professors at 
University College London, Newcastle, Cambridge and Oxford universities), but also had all 
- at one time or another - worked under Ken as their line manager at GSK (see Exhibit 1). 
Ken negotiated with the founding universities and a biotech services company, offering them 
shareholdings in his new venture in return for some rights to the initial core intellectual assets 
and the supporting patents (see Exhibit 1). He also succeeded in attracting other non-
scientific co-founders who were experienced professionals in the financial and medical and 
business fields, who invested in Sparrow via an angel backed company, Unibio Ventures.  
--------------------------- 
Insert Exhibit 1 here 
-------------------------- 
                                                 
4
 A scientist who studies viruses and viral diseases 
  
 
6 
Ken’s (and his colleagues’) ambition was to build Sparrow into a prominent drug 
discovery and development company, whose products would be used to treat the world’s 
most serious and widespread infectious diseases. Ken believed Sparrow’s entry into the 
biopharmaceutical sector in the 1990s was timely, because the market for young technology 
companies was starting to heat up. The UK biotechnology drug sector had over a hundred 
small firms, all claiming to have novel approaches to drug development, and the whole sector 
was supported by the large pharmaceutical companies, with whom many smaller firms struck 
licensing deals to fund their drug development activities in return for promises of sharing 
future profits when their discoveries were marketed.  
So Ken designed Sparrow’s market entry along the lines of what was fast becoming a 
well established business model: forming a small drug discovery/development company that 
creates value by making scientific progress in areas that might be of use to larger companies. 
Ken’s intention (like those of other such UK biotechs) was to target drugs for development 
that nobody else had previously succeeded in bringing to the market. His team was 
particularly interested in using novel technological approaches to ensure high quality outputs, 
higher productivity and lower costs than its competitors. They believed this strategy would 
increase their chances of success in an industry that was fraught with risk, and was typically 
characterized by drug discovery and development times that could be very long - perhaps 
over 12 years - as well as being costly and unpredictable (Exhibit 2 shows the established 
drug discovery/development route and its cost and timing norms).  
Ken’s aim was for Sparrow to get drug prospects out of the university laboratory 
setting and through the first research/discovery step and into the ‘Pre-clinical’ trial phase 
much faster than the typical 6 years and much more cheaply than the £9 million ($14 million) 
industry averages. He knew smaller biotech firms could be much more efficient than larger 
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pharmaceuticals, and even hoped to achieve Phase I Clinical trials more cheaply, too. His 
rationale was:  
“We decided that to set up a UK company with late stage development (and 
marketing) capability would be impossible to fund. And that’s what large 
pharmaceutical companies do extremely well. They have very sophisticated machines 
for late stage clinical development and marketing. However, their research 
productivity has become of major concern. I see us as a company providing that 
expertise in the early stage research and development, and the large pharmaceutical 
providing us with expertise in late stage development and the marketing expertise so 
that we don’t have to, because it is a major expense.” 
--------------------------- 
Insert Exhibit 2 here 
-------------------------- 
 
Setting up the company 1998-2000 
When Sparrow was founded in 1998, Ken became the CEO and during the first year hired 
three other employees to set up the company, retaining the other scientific co-founders as 
consultants and outsourcing work on Sparrow’s initial research programs to its founding 
academic institutions. By March 2000, he had raised about £1 million ($1.6 million) - almost 
£0.2m from his founding partner Unibio (an investment company backed by business angels) 
and around £0.8m from 43 individual business angels, each investing between £10,000 and 
£50,000 (see Exhibit 3 for Sparrow’s initial funding history), and set up a board dominated 
by these scientific and financial founders (see Exhibit 4). Many of the business angels 
supported Sparrow’s early fund raising efforts because Ken had emphasized the 
attractiveness of its target activity to the large pharmaceutical industry companies and the 
novelty of its technology: he also highlighted the high caliber of Sparrow’s founders and 
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partners, which gave investors confidence that these opportunities could be exploited and 
ramped up quickly and profitably.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Exhibits 3 and 4 here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Early Stage Development of Sparrow 2000-2003 
Ken believed that high quality research in the complex biotechnology field could only come 
from strong core in-house capabilities, so from 2000 he shifted Sparrow’s focus to building 
these up and relying less on outsourcing work, hiring (initially) 10 full time employees. In 
July 2000, he took advantage of the exceptionally favorable funding environment to raise a 
further £11m (about $18m), mainly from 8 VC companies interested in biotech innovation. 
As only a few of Sparrow’s founding business angel investors (and one scientific partner) 
could afford to add to their earlier investments, this huge influx of capital meant a significant 
drop in the percentage of the company owned by the founders (see Exhibit 3) – but they all 
accepted the situation, as they judged the incoming investment would greatly increase 
Sparrow’s potential to make future profits. This investment round also meant changes in the 
board make-up, with the balance of power shifting from the founders towards the new VC 
investors (see Exhibit 4). So Ken’s strategy for Sparrow from now on had to be particularly 
sensitive to the needs of these new stakeholders, whose board representation meant they 
could veto any significant shift in Sparrow’s strategic direction.  
Bolstered by these new funds, Ken led Sparrow on an active recruiting phase to build 
its internal molecular biology team and medicinal chemistry capabilities - specialized in-
house competences that Ken believed would boost Sparrow’s productivity and underpin its 
competitive advantage. Ken appointed one of his scientific co-founders (Professor Ian 
Charlton) as Chief Scientific Officer (CSO) with the mandate to significantly expand 
  
 
9 
Sparrow’s biology group and recruited Stuart Cocks as Head of Chemistry to lead the 
expansion of Sparrow’s chemistry capabilities, both of whom had very strong industry and 
relevant therapeutic and drug discovery experience. He also added Ian Phelps to the team as 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), to make the most of his experience of biotechnology 
financing.  
By early 2001, Ken’s strategy seemed to be paying off. Sparrow announced two 
potential products ready to enter preclinical development: the cost and speed with which they 
had been prepared compared very favorably to the industry norms. To capitalize on this 
success, Ken appointed Sue Gaither as Clinical Development Director to manage the 
company’s projects through their later development stage. He also persuaded the board to 
relocate to a new London building that doubled Sparrow’s available office and laboratory 
space, and equipped this new HQ with state of the art chemistry, molecular biology and 
microbiology facilities that rivaled those of the big pharmaceutical companies. Sparrow’s 
new London home put it closer to most of the UK-based pharmaceutical industry, giving it 
better access to potential national and international partners and customers and to the London 
-based European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA, the European 
equivalent of the FDA in the US) and to leading European financial communities.  
In January 2002, Sparrow took another step when Ken persuaded his board to acquire 
a smaller company involved in gene technology in exchange for about £1 million 
($1.6million)-worth of Sparrow shares. This was an opportunistic move - the target company 
had fallen on hard times and was cheap, and Ken felt its assets would strengthen Sparrow’s 
basic anti-bacterial research, an area where his managers believed success was quite difficult 
to achieve. These measures made it easier for Ken to recruit the best talent from British 
universities and industry, and Sparrow grew from about 20 staff in 2001 to almost 80 by 
2003. But he knew that Sparrow’s expansion would put a financial strain on the business (see 
  
 
10 
Exhibits 5 and 6 for Sparrow’s financial statements). Drug development was an expensive 
enterprise - and Ken knew he had to find a way of prioritizing Sparrow’s product portfolio if 
he was to invest the company’s decreasing cash reserves optimally. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Exhibits 5 and 6 here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Sparrow’s Products and Organization 
Up to 2003, Sparrow’s scientific program was organized around developing potential 
products to treat serious infectious diseases arising from both viral and bacterial infections. 
During his time at GSK, Ken had worked as a virologist on frontier science involving major 
antiviral infections (such as HIV), while his co-founder and CSO Ian Charlton was a 
prominent molecular biologist who had long worked (also at GSK) on infections from 
bacterial sources. Up to 2003, Sparrow’s product development efforts were focused 50-50 on 
anti-viral and anti-bacterial products, and its scientific capabilities were broadly divided 
between its chemistry and the biology groups, organized via 8 multidisciplinary project teams 
working on 8 different potential products. Each project team was headed by a project 
manager and composed of a multidisciplinary team of scientists assigned to the teams as 
required. Ken ensured that Sparrow’s potential products were all in market segments where 
potential annual sales could top £1billion ($1.6billion).  
But by the end of 2003, Ken and his management team (and Sparrow’s board) had 
become increasingly concerned at the breadth of the company’s program and the rate it was 
spending cash. They also recognized that the environment for small drug-development 
companies in the UK was undergoing a sea-change. The amount of external new money 
available for investment in small firms was being squeezed: both the UK’s venture capital 
firms (until now Sparrow’s main source of finance) and the sums they invested were 
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shrinking, and almost all the non-UK VC firms had withdrawn to concentrate on their 
domestic markets. Other finance sources were drying up too: although new stock market 
listings were taking place (mainly on the London AIM market5), their numbers were only half 
those of the late 1990s, and the sums raised were also less. To make matters worse, large 
pharmaceutical firms were shifting away from financing potential products at their earliest 
development stages towards more mature products that had already passed their Phase 2 (or 
even Phase 3) trials. This meant that smaller companies such as Sparrow had to spend more 
time, effort and cash to developing their potential products. 
Ken knew he had to assess the speed and progress of Sparrow’s different programs 
with a critical eye: it was clear the antiviral programs had progressed faster than the 
antibacterial projects (see Exhibit 7). So, by the end of 2003, although Sparrow’s scientific 
achievements ensured it of a strong reputation, it became obvious that Sparrow urgently 
needed reorganizing and refocusing to meet the new environment. In simple terms, Sparrow 
had concentrated its efforts to date on making good science, henceforth it was going to have 
to make sure it made good money, too.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Exhibit 7 here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Reorganization and refocus 2004 - 2006 
By early 2004, Sparrow’s main success had been in advancing its two leading potential 
antiviral products, the first of which was approaching the clinical trial stage (see Exhibit 7). 
Ken’s new strategy involved focusing Sparrow on developing potential products in the 
antiviral area and shelving the company’s anti-bacterial programs. This shift meant Ken 
parting company with one of his long-time colleagues, Ian Charlton, a co-founder of 
                                                 
5
 “The AIM is the London Stock Exchange’s international market for smaller growing companies” (LSE at 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/for-companies/companies.htm) 
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Sparrow, its CSO and champion of its antibacterial work. The new reorganization effectively 
shelved all Ian’s projects, so he resigned and was replaced as CSO by Stuart Cocks, 
previously head of the chemistry group. Ken was devastated that such a loyal colleague, who 
had shared enthusiastically in his original vision for Sparrow’s journey, was getting off the 
train - but he clearly saw it was the only way he could get the support of the board to get new 
cash into the business. Ken’s strategy also meant downsizing Sparrow’s research and 
development (R&D) staff (from a peak of 70 in early 2004 to about 50 by the end of 2005) 
and removing a whole layer of management to adopt a flatter organizational structure (see 
Exhibit 8). His intention was to refocus Sparrow on developing only the most promising 
potential products to Phase II and doing so quickly so they could be sold to large 
pharmaceutical companies. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Exhibit 8 here 
----------------------------------------- 
For the first time, Ken also hired a Commercial Director (Barbra Domain) whose 
mandate was to find potential buyers for Sparrow’s products. She wrote a report – mainly to 
inform Sparrow’s potential partners - of Sparrow’s products that outlined: (1) their novel 
scientific characteristics and (2) their commercial potential, including the projected cost of 
their manufacture, their target markets’ size and profiles and the associated patient treatment. 
Her job involved identifying and engaging potential pharmaceutical ‘suitors’, making 
presentations to them, leading negotiations with interested parties, structuring and sealing the 
relevant deals and then managing the on-going relationships.  
Ken had bridged Sparrow’s immediate cash needs by getting his existing first round 
VCs to invest a further £7 million ($11million) in convertible loans. But the new strategy of 
implementing a much more focused and leaner business model based entirely on anti-viral 
therapeutic compounds now allowed Ken and his management team to go out and 
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successfully raise cash by selling new shares, and they managed to attract some £16.4 million 
($27 million), largely from a fresh crop of VC investors. The new funding involved some 
complex deals, with the existing and incoming VC shareholders agreeing to share special 
control rights over Sparrow’s future direction. The incoming investors appointed two new 
directors, shifting the balance of power firmly into the financiers’ hands: they now had five 
board seats, with only four directors representing other interests (see Exhibits 3 and 4). The 
new board agreed to award some shares to management (as a share option scheme) on 
condition Sparrow reached its targets (refer to Exhibit 3). A key factor in Ken’s success in 
raising this new capital was his pledge to succeed in a sector where Sparrow was well ahead 
of competition. 
 
Competition 
Ken had been in antiviral diseases for most of his working life, and knew the market segment 
was a huge and potentially lucrative part of the infectious diseases market, worth (in 2005) 
about 3% of the US$ 545 billion global pharmaceutical market. Spurred by the expected 
growth in demand from emerging markets, the segment was forecast to grow at double the 
industry’s projected overall 4.3% annual growth rate. Like every other UK biotech company 
executive, Ken also saw North America as Sparrow’s primary market (it represented about 
51% of the global market, as compared to Europe at about 30%), and flew to the USA on a 
monthly basis. Ken was also well aware of how the large biopharmaceutical companies 
(Pfizer, GSK, AstraZeneca, Merck, Novartis, etc.) dominated the drug industry, and that he 
had to assess them as potential suitors for Sparrow, either for licensing deals6 or a trade sale 
                                                 
6
 A licensing deal is when a company gives another the right to commercialise  its products or intellectual 
property 
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exit.7 A suitable match would have to have an interest (and maybe some competence as well) 
in the infectious disease area, and Ken asked Barbra Domain, his new Commercial Director, 
to work on assessing potential suitors.  
Barbra had found that most large pharmaceutical companies’ anti-viral programs had 
failed and been discontinued, and that most of the competition in the sector was from other 
smaller biotechnology companies or university-based research programs. Her report outlined 
a total of 36 programs globally, of which half had been discontinued and the rest were at least 
one stage behind Sparrow’s equivalent programs. Ken felt none of its competitors were 
financially strong enough to make them attractive as merger candidates or partners, and that 
Sparrow would have to generate some money through its own licensing strategy to avoid 
diluting its investors’ shareholdings any further.  
 
The Novartis Licensing Deal  
Although Sparrow’s refocusing only slightly lessened the rate at which it spent cash (as the 
financial statements in Exhibits 5 and 6 show), it did lead to it making faster scientific 
progress. By the end of 2004, Sparrow was seeing positive results: its lead potential product 
(designed to combat Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV) lung infections) had completed its 
Phase 1 trials successfully and was scheduled to start Phase 2 in 2005, after which Ken 
intended to license it for cash to a large pharmaceutical company. But the cash investment 
needed to get a potential drug through Phase 2 trials (see Exhibit 2) was more than Sparrow 
could bear, so Barbra started looking for potential partners straight away, rather than waiting 
until Phase 2 trials were completed.  
Ken judged that a licensing deal with a reputable biopharmaceutical company would 
send positive signals about Sparrow’s work into the market, helping attract other such deals 
                                                 
7
 A trade sale exit is when a company is bought by another, thus allowing its shareholders to recoup the capital 
they have invested. 
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in the future. At the same time both he and his co-founders were keen to raise funding 
through such deals rather than selling more shares, which would have reduced their 
percentage ownership yet further. Although Barbara engaged numerous large pharmaceutical 
companies, only Novartis - motivated by the chance to enter and learn about a new 
therapeutic area - made a quick and serious offer that met Sparrow’s criteria. Ken was keen to 
wrap up the deal quickly too – which he did in mid 2005 - because Sparrow needed the 
money on offer: £6 million ($9.6 million) upfront, with up to £150 million ($140 million) in 
potential progress payments (which would fund the project’s future clinical trial costs) and 
potentially very much more in royalties to be paid on an agreed percentage of future revenues 
when the drug reached the market.  
While Ken was happy with the licensing deal for the RSV compound, cash was still 
needed to fund the development of other promising projects, which were close behind RSV 
and could supply more cash once licensed. One of Sparrow’s two potential drug products 
targeted at Hepatitis C (a major disease) was entering Phase 1 trials, and the pipeline also 
contained two other product development programs at earlier stages. Ken estimated Sparrow 
needed to be able to invest a further £15 to £20 million ($24 to $32 million) in these products 
before another license deal could be made, but that the potential rate of return on this 
investment was excellent, as the company might double in value if these milestones could be 
reached. But it didn’t look as if this cash would come from the investors currently on the 
Board – if anything, the opposite seemed more likely.  
 
Investor Pressure to exit 
Indeed, far from adding to their financial input, by late 2005 some of Sparrow’s earlier VC 
investors were keen to cash in their stakes, and their board representatives pressured the rest 
of the board (and Ken and his management team) to use the momentum from the Novartis 
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deal to find a way for them to exit. The more recent investors, although not in any real hurry, 
also wanted the Board to define a clear exit strategy, while Sparrow’s founders and oldest 
angel investors also saw the value of delaying, as Sparrow’s product portfolio was still 
relatively immature. Ken categorized their motives and interests more specifically: 
 As Exhibit 3 shows, Sparrow’s 1st round Venture Capital investors still owned 
about 45% of the company. They had been with Sparrow for nearly 5 years, and Ken 
thought they simply felt ‘tired’. But he also knew they were under external pressure to 
exit (as the funds where they sourced their money were maturing and needed to return 
cash to their own shareholders). So this group would find it hard to justify staying 
longer unless the rate of return was really attractive – for them speed of exit was more 
important than the actual cash they could realize from their shares.  
 In contrast, Ken thought that Sparrow’s 2nd round VC investors (who had only 
recently come on board, and owned about 32% of the company) were relatively more 
open to putting more money into the company to get its other potential products to 
their later development stages, which would raise Sparrow’s value very significantly - 
perhaps doubling it in two years. But they were equally open to selling their shares if 
an attractive cash offer came in - their main interest was in achieving high returns to 
cover the investment risks they had taken.  
 Ken knew that his co-founders and business angels were all worried that drawing in 
further equity funding would reduce their percentage ownership. Exhibit 3 shows that 
even Ken owned less than 1% of Sparrow by now: its original 43 business angels’ 
combined share had dropped below 10%, and Ken knew they did not have the 
financial strength to buy new shares to increase their stakes. But he wanted to repay 
the loyalty they had shown Sparrow since the early days. This group recognized that 
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an exit could bring much needed new cash into the company – but only if any new 
shares sold at high prices, which meant Sparrow had to be more highly valued than it 
currently was. This could only happen if Sparrow had more time to get its drug 
candidates to a more mature stage – which, in turn, would take more cash. And – as a 
founder-scientist - Ken also wanted to ensure Sparrow retained its autonomy and 
independence, to safeguard his mission to take its projects to the world’s drug 
markets.  
Given these diverse interests, it was not immediately clear to Ken which strategic exit option, 
and which timing, would be the best for all concerned: the company (which he saw as 
including not just its mission, but also the interests of its employees) and its investors – who 
now also controlled its board. 
 
The Options by June 2006 
For the past year, Ken had worked with Barbra and the CFO Ian Phelps on exploring various 
options to find an exit solution that would be acceptable to all stakeholders. They could either 
sell Sparrow outright to a larger pharmaceutical company for cash as soon as possible or  list 
the company on a public stock exchange via an initial public offering (IPO) within the 
coming year, so allowing investors to sell their shares as they wished. They could also delay 
the exit for two years in the hope of increasing (perhaps doubling) the company’s value, so 
making any subsequent flotation or sale more successful.  
 
A possible sale? 
During the past year, Ken and Barbra had engaged with a number of large pharmaceutical 
companies to gauge their interest in licensing Sparrow’s products. Exhibit 9 below lists those 
that had shown an interest by mid 2006.  
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Exhibit 9 here 
----------------------------------- 
AstraZeneca was one of several that had expressed an interest: it wanted to enter the antiviral 
market area (where it had no presence at the time) and believed Sparrow’s antiviral programs 
offered a good fit with its existing strategy, complementing its established expertise in 
gastrointestinal and respiratory areas. As the discussions proceeded, Ken realized that 
Sparrow was a very good acquisition opportunity for AstraZeneca, who would be buying a 
company with considerable expertise in an area where they had none. AstraZeneca quickly 
understood the type of deal Ken was looking for: one that offered a quick and reasonably 
lucrative exit for those investors who wanted out, but also gave Sparrow continued 
operational security - and offered an outright acquisition at what they believed was a fair 
valuation and on good terms, plus the promise of enough future operational cash and 
continued autonomy, allowing Sparrow to go on developing its programs and giving its 
employees job security. Ken’s only worries were whether Sparrow’s main investors would be 
attracted by AstraZeneca’s offer - and whether he should trust AstraZeneca to maintain 
Sparrow’s autonomy.  
The offer on the table was an outright acquisition of Sparrow for about £76 million 
($120 million) in cash (about twice the total of £35 million that had been put into the 
company since 1998), so the deal offered strongly positive returns. But investors in the VC 
world thought a good return was 5 or 10 times the original sum invested. (In fact, they knew 
that relatively few investments - even in the very best VC portfolios - achieved this kind of 
return in reality. Indeed, most find at least 50% of their investments fail even to return their 
original stakes: but, to justify their existence, VC groups press for high returns so that they, in 
turn, can please their VC investor-owners). On the other hand, the deal was for cash – it 
offered Sparrow’s investors zero risk: there were none of the ‘conditional clauses’ often 
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found in higher value deals. All the same, Sparrow’s managers worried whether it was going 
to be enough. Ken knew that the valuation would be greater if the company managed to 
progress some of its potential products further into clinical trials, judging that success in such 
trials would at least double this valuation (maybe more) – although (of course) there was 
always the risk the clinical data might not turn out as he hoped and expected. 
When Ken looked back over the past year of discussions, formal and informal, with 
potential acquisition suitors, he realized that very few, in fact, had expressed any serious 
interest. But he also realized his team hadn’t really been pushing very hard to sell the 
company - rather, they had been holding out for better prices and terms, believing Sparrow’s 
value would change rapidly as its drug candidate portfolio matured. But now there was a real 
offer on the table, could he afford to let it go in the hope of getting a better deal from 
elsewhere in the future? Or was going for a public listing in the medium term future a better 
choice?  
 
IPO and Stock Market listing 
As well as seeking licensing partners over the past year, Ken’s team had invited financial 
advisors and investment bankers to make presentations to them on the prospects for a 
successful IPO. One clear message that came through was that, in terms of Sparrow’s profile, 
the Novartis deal had done what Ken had hoped, in sending a validation signal to the market 
about the strength of the company’s technology that could enhance the chances of a 
successful IPO. The advisers provided Sparrow with options for listings on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in London or the New York-
based NASDAQ, but it was not clear which would suit Sparrow best because their listing 
criteria differed considerably. And most advisors also felt that Sparrow’s prospects for 
getting the right valuation were only mixed, at best.  
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London Stock Exchange Listing (LSE) 
Most of the experts who pitched to Sparrow thought the prevailing market sentiment was that 
new companies needed to have two to three products in advanced clinical trials to achieve a 
successful listing. The thinking was that companies in that position could generate a 
sufficient news stream about future developments to register on market analysts’ radar, and 
thus achieve a really successful IPO on the LSE, ensuring a high market valuation of (ideally) 
upwards of £200 million ($320 million). The increased analyst and media attention gained by 
such a news stream would ensure an active market that attracted new investors, allowing 
those investors who wanted to sell to do so without lowering the company’s share price. 
Ken tried to think it through with his CFO, Ian Phelps. Ken wasn’t convinced 
Sparrow had enough potential products in advanced enough stages to ensure a successful 
listing – but Ian pointed out the market could be fickle and this criteria might not turn out to 
be so critical. They agreed that an LSE listing might work if the market could be convinced 
Sparrow was likely to achieve critical mass quickly. But Ian pointed out that this meant 
getting financing to invest in their potential products, or alternatively merging with another 
company and consolidating their product lines – neither of which Ken could see happening 
quickly enough. The overall impression given by most of its financial advisors was that 
Sparrow was really a borderline case for LSE listing – while it did have a major validating 
licensing deal, a potential product in clinical trials phase 1 and another in advanced pre-
clinical trials stage, they felt some analysts would still see this as too ‘thin’ a pipeline. 
Furthermore (and more pertinent to its VC investors’ interests) an IPO would not offer 
Sparrow the immediate and guaranteed access to the financing it needed because of the time 
needed to become listed and gain legal permission to sell shares. So, overall, no clear view 
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emerged from the advisers’ presentations as to the prospects of Sparrow achieving a 
successful early LSE listing. 
 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) listing 
The feedback from the investment bankers and advisors was that Sparrow could be listed on 
the London AIM much more quickly, as the listing requirements are considerably lower to 
encourage young resource-constrained companies. Many UK biopharmaceutical companies 
were listed on the AIM, and it was clear that such a listing would give the company added 
respectability in the eyes of potential partners. But the advisors pointed out that the financing 
available via such smaller markets was quite limited. Ian Phelps (the CFO) thought the 
amount the company was looking for (at least £15m to £20m) was too large for AIM, and that 
subsequent offerings of shares would fail to find buyers:  
“There is a very real risk that once you have done the AIM IPO you may get stuck 
and further fund raising may be blocked.”  
The limited financing available meant an AIM listing would be very unlikely to raise enough 
cash to both support Sparrow’s product pipeline development and allow for an immediate 
exit for its investors. Ken, who knew the USA market well, wanted to consider options there 
as well and look at the prospects for listing on the NASDAQ index that had a reputation for 
providing financing for small and innovative companies. 
 
NASDAQ listing 
Ken believed the NASDAQ market offered the significant advantages of being bigger and 
more established than AIM, as well as of being reputed to have more experience dealing with 
biotechnology companies. However, the financial advisers who pitched to Sparrow were 
anxious that, as there were many such small companies in the USA, providing the adequate 
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and constant levels of news flow needed to gain analysts’ attention might be difficult: they 
feared Sparrow would just end up as a small fish in the big NASDAQ pond. Barbra pointed 
out a strategy that might mitigate this problem:  
“Another route of getting a foothold in the USA market could be through an M&A8 
with another company already listed on NASDAQ” 
Ken and Barbra had done a lot of work to explore this option, and had identified an 
opportunity - a NASDAQ listed US based company with plenty of cash that had recently 
experienced a disappointment with one of its products at the clinical stage, and so needed to 
augment its pipeline. Sparrow - an unlisted company with a pipeline of good prospects and 
needing cash - would be a good potential fit. Barbra explained how far negotiations about a 
potential deal had progressed:  
“We have gone a very long way down the track on M&A discussions. We have 
basically discussed all the integration issues we are going to face. We have taken a 
very good look at the cultural differences, how the management structure was going 
to be organized, etc. We have talked about the valuation negotiation which of course 
was a very difficult part.” 
But Ken realized the integration problems would be substantial: two potentially explosive 
issues these negotiations highlighted were how to deal with declining shareholding 
percentages, and the fact that each company would view the other’s assets a lot less positively 
than their own, making it more difficult to achieve agreement as to which goals should drive 
value going forward. The cultural differences were also considerable: Ken and his team 
valued their autonomy to drive Sparrow’s future strategy, and negotiations revealed this 
                                                 
8
 An M&A refers to mergers and acquisitions and is a general term used to refer to the consolidation of 
companies. A merger is a combination of two companies to form a new company while an acquisition is the 
purchase of one company by another in which no new company is formed.  
  
 
23 
might not be guaranteed. So Sparrow had to seriously consider other options - finding ways 
to keep going. 
 
Delay considering either exit option for at least two years 
Ken knew the only way of resisting the pressure to provide an immediate exit was to increase 
the value of the company considerably. Sparrow’s next program (Hepatitis C, which was due 
to complete its clinical trial Phase 1 in late 2006) was in a potentially exciting area, and 
would give the company a major uplift in value if it could get through to the next stage. The 
company also had a second Hepatitis C program running about a year behind the first in 
development terms, and each of these projects was potentially more exciting than the drug 
Sparrow had licensed to Novartis. If both of these drugs came through their upcoming trials, 
it was not unreasonable to think that Sparrow’s value would double within 2 years: set 
against the additional development costs involved (some £15 - £20 million) this increase in 
market value would represent a remarkably good rate of return. From a corporate finance 
standpoint, the case was most clearly in favor of delaying a sale or floatation to give Sparrow 
a chance to capture this value. The obstacle, of course, was lack of cash. Ken was also keen 
to consider financing routes that avoided selling more equity, not least because he did not 
want his own percentage shareholding to decline even further. One such option was to license 
Sparrow’s Hepatitis C programs to regional firms. 
 
Licensing to regional firms? 
Ken and Barbra had explored the idea of raising cash by licensing its potential products in 
Japan and the wider Asian market, while retaining commercialization rights for the prime 
healthcare markets (Europe and the USA). Barbra had gone into quite advanced discussions 
with three Japanese companies with a view to doing such a regional deal, and had reported 
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that this route would raise perhaps between £5 and £10 million ($8 to $16 million) cash up 
front, which Sparrow could use to develop some of its potential products past some critical 
clinical milestones, as well as yielding future milestone and royalty payments. But this 
amount still fell at least £10 million short of Sparrow’s estimated development finance needs 
and the risk of losing intellectual property rights in some Asian markets also had to be 
considered.  
 
Another equity funding round? 
Previous board meetings had discussed the possibility of a new equity funding round, and had 
tentatively agreed some key commercial elements of a deal current VC investors would find 
acceptable. But Ken knew his co-founders and the business angels who had first invested in 
Sparrow considered the terms involved unfair, as they reduced their percentage shareholding 
ownership disproportionately. Ken also thought that, while there was a good chance he could 
convince the second round investors to support a third funding round, the first round VCs still 
wanted out.  
What to do? 
It was clear to Ken that none of these options was an obvious ‘best choice’ - each had its own 
set of challenges. But, somehow, he needed to decide which would be the best for the 
company, for its investors - and for him. The VC investors were split into two main camps – 
for the first round investors, a quick, cash exit was a priority, while the second round 
investors (and the original business angels) would probably go for whichever option gave 
them the best return. Ken also had his own managers (some of them – like him - investors 
themselves) to think about: and they weren’t keen on a further private funding round, as their 
current investors were proving very demanding.  
So - what should he choose?  
 Exhibit 1: Founder’s Round and Management team 
  
Founders Vocation Expertise Short bios shares % owned Value 
1 Ken Powers Professor; CEO Virology Formerly Head of antiviral research at GSK and founder of two previous 
small biotech companies. CEO of Sparrow at founding. 3,500 8.97% 3,500 
2 Ian Charlton Professor; CSO Genetics, 
Molecular 
Biology 
Professor of Molecular biology at University College London, previously 
Head of Molecular pharmacology at GSK. Appointed Chief Scientific 
Officer and Executive Director in 2000. 
3,000 7.69% 3,000 
3 Jim Sable Research Scientist Cancer Had extensive drug discovery experience in HIV inhibitors and anti-cancer 
research. Appointed as first Project manager in 1999. 3,000 7.69% 3,000 
4 Alastair Hops Professor Molecular 
genetics 
Professor of Molecular Genetics at University of Newcastle and an expert on 
the structures and functions of microbial enzymes. Sparrow outsourced 
some work to his laboratory. 
2,500 6.41% 2,500 
5 Dave Summers Professor Bacteriology Professor at the Veterinary School at Cambridge University with extensive 
pharmaceutical experience applying structural biology information. Sparrow 
outsourced some work to his laboratory. 
2,500 6.41% 2,500 
6  University 
College London 
Technology Transfer 
Office 
Technology 
commercializa
tion 
The UCL TTO is part of UCL and is responsible for the commercialization 
of all university intellectual property 1,500 3.85% 1,500 
7 Newcastle 
University 
Technology Transfer 
Office 
Technology 
commercializa
tion 
Newcastle TTO is part of Newcastle university and is responsible for the 
commercialization of all university intellectual property 2,500 6.41% 2,500 
8 Unibio 
Ventures 
Angel backed company Venture seed 
capital 
An investment company set up by two professors of medicine, two financial 
consultants and a prominent businessman 18,000 46.15% 18,000 
9  Biotech 
Services 
Biotech Services 
company 
Toxicology A biotech services company specializing in toxicology. 2,500 6.41% 2,500 
Management  Team     
Stuart Cocks Research Director 
(Joined 2000 ) 
Scientist PhD in chemistry. Chemist; Inventor; Senior Group Leader in Medicinal 
Chemistry, GSK 
 
  
Sue Gaither Clinical Development  
Director (Joined May 
2001) 
Scientist PhD in toxicology. Scientist and Qualified Lawyer. Assessor at the 
Medicines Control Agency.  
 
  
Ian Phelps CFO (Joined in June 
2001) 
Chartered 
accountant 
KPMG specializing in the pharmaceutical sector. CFO and Head of 
Operations, Celltech US; CFO of Amarin 
 
  
Barbra 
Domain 
Commercial Director  
(Joined 2003) 
Scientist  
 
Senior Business Development Manager at Celltech. Senior marketing, sales 
and commercial strategy roles. Strategic Advisory Services as a 
management;  
 
  
 Exhibit 2: Drug development process 
 
 
 
*years are not set in stone and may vary from company to company
Research & Drug            
Discovery 
 
        Phase 3        Preclinical 
        Trials 
  
      Phase 1 
   
     Phase 2 
Time* 
 
Activity Synthesis, 
examination 
& screening 
Laboratory 
& animal 
studies 
20 to 80 
healthy 
volunteers 
100 to 300 
patient 
volunteers 
1,000 to 3,000 
patient 
volunteers 
Evaluate 
effectiven
ess, look 
for side 
effects 
Verify 
effectiveness, 
monitor adverse 
reactions from 
long term use  
Assess 
activity 
potency 
Assess 
safety and 
biological 
activity 
Determine 
safety and 
dosage 
Purpose of 
Activity 
Success 
rate 
10,000 to 
30,000 
substances 
10 to 20 
compounds 
evaluated 
 
5 to 10 enter trials – 1approved 
    3yrs                          3yrs                 1yr              2yrs                 3yrs               
 
Est. devt. Cost 
per compound    
per phase             
 £3m                     £6m                    £10m                  £20m                  £200m
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Exhibit 3: Sparrow Therapeutics funding history 
 
 % Ownership after funding round 
 Mar-99 Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Dec-04 
Founder 1 (Ken Powers) 8.09% 7.18% 3.44%   0.63% 
Founder 2 (Ian Charlton) 6.93% 6.15% 2.95%   0.35% 
Founder 3 (Alastair Hops) 5.78% 5.13% 2.46%   0.12% 
Founder 4  (Dave Summers) 5.78% 5.13% 2.46%   0.12% 
Founder 5  (Jim Sable) 6.93% 6.15% 2.95%   0.17% 
Founder 6  (UCL) 3.47% 3.08% 1.48%   0.06% 
Founder 7  (Newcastle University) 5.78% 5.13% 2.46%   0.10% 
Founder 8 (Unibio Ventures) 41.60% 36.93% 20.53%   5.29% 
Founder 9  Biotech Services 5.78% 5.13% 2.46%   0.00% 
Business Angels total # 43 9.82% 19.99% 9.98%   9.62% 
First round VCs 
  48.84%   44.6% 
Second round VCs 
     32.0% 
2002 acquisition * 
     3.64% 
Management share options 
     3.3% 
 
      
Financing: new cash raised £ 000s       
Paid in capital 472 574 11,106   16,408 
Issue of loan stock** 
   3,545 3,500  
 
      
* M&A shares issued only and a not cash consideration 
**Loan stock issued in 2002 and 2003 converted into paid in capital in 2004 
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Exhibit 4: Sparrow’s Board Representation history (‘B’ means represented on the board) 
 
 Mar-99 Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 
Founder 1 (Ken Powers) B B B B B B B 
Founder 2 (Ian Charlton)  B B B B   
Founder 3 (Alastair Hops)        
Founder 4 (Dave Summers) B B       
Founder 6 (Jim Sable)  B       
Founder 5 (UCL)         
Founder 7 (Newcastle Uni.)         
Founder 8 Unibio Ventures Rep 1* B B B B B B B 
Founder 8 Unibio Ventures Rep 2 B B B B B   
Founder 8 Unibio Ventures Rep 3 B B      
Founder 8 Unibio Ventures Rep 4 B B      
Founder 8 Unibio Ventures Rep 5 B B      
Founder 8 Unibio Ventures Rep 6 B B      
Founder 9  Biotech Services        
Business Angels total # 47        
First round VC Rep 1 
  
B B B B B 
First round VC Rep 2   B B B B B 
First round VC Rep 3 
   B B B B 
First round VC Rep 4    B B   
M&A investor Rep    B B   
Independent Director**    B B B B 
Chief Financial Officer   B B B B B 
Commercial Director     B   
Second round VC Rep 1 
    
 B B 
Second round VC Rep 2 
    
 B B 
*Chairman from founding to 2002 
**Independent Director appointed Chairman in 2003 
 
 
Exhibit 5: Sparrow Therapeutics financial statements – income statement (in £ 000s) 
 
for 12 months ending Mar-99 Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 
Dec-04  
(18 months) Dec-05 
Revenues  38 966 524 59 457 351 
R&D expenses 199 920 2,226 4,095 6,799 16,503 5,117 
Admin expenses 50 222 866 2,184 2,429 4,388 2,796 
Operating profit (loss) (249) (1,104) (2,126) (5,755) (9,169) (20,434) (7,562) 
 
       
Disposal of lab. equipment      236  
Interest receivable 3 22 420 238 88 238 173 
Interest payable (11) (33) (40) (87) (411) (324) (1786) 
 
       
Pre-tax profit/(loss) (257) (1,115) (1,746) (5,604) (9,492) (20,284) (9,175) 
Taxes (credit)    (266) (649) (3,021) (1,052) 
Net income (loss) (257) (1,115) (1,745) (5,338) (8,843) (17,263) (8,123) 
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Exhibit 6: Sparrow Therapeutics financial statements – balance sheet (£ in 000s) 
 
As at end of Mar-99 Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 
Assets*        
Fixed assets  205 330 748 6,505 5,842 2,727 2,349 
Accounts receivable 19 29 1,023 1,471 1,741 2,074 2,655 
Cash at bank and in hand 606 284 8,221 3,900 359 2,964 3,600 
Total assets 830 643 9,992 11,876 7,942 7,765 8,604 
        
        
Liabilities and equity        
Total current liabilities 250 350 822 852 1,360 2,122 4,000 
Convertible loans    3,562 7,812   
Other long term liabilities 365 620 84 215 366 185 5,790 
Net paid in  capital 472 1,045 12,113 15,702 15,702 40,019 41,498 
Retained earnings (257) (1,372) (3,117) (8,455) (17,298) (34,561) (42,684) 
Total liabilities and equity 830 643 9,902 11,876 7,942 7,765 8,604 
*Intellectual Property assets are not included in the balance sheets in line with UK accounting standards
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 Exhibit 7: Sparrow Therapeutics’ Product Pipeline as at end of 2005 
 
 Research & 
Drug discovery 
Preclinical 
studies 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Respiratory Syncytial Virus Project  2003 2004 2005  
Hepatitis C Project 1  2004 2005   
Hepatitis C Project 2 (polymerase) 2004 2005    
Herpes virus  2005     
Antibacterial Programs 2004 (shelved)     
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Exhibit 8: Organization Chart 
 
 
 
 
Project team 
(Hep C) 
Project team 
(Herpes) 
Project team 
(RSV) 
Project team 
(Hep C) 
Bacterial 
Project 2 
Bacterial 
Project 3 
Bacterial 
Project 1 
Bacterial 
Project 4 
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Ken Powers 
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Development 
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Sue Gaither 
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Commercial Director 
Barbra Domain 
Chief  
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Ceased 2004 
 
Added 2004 
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Exhibit 9: Potential suitors list as at June 2006 
Firm HQ and size (employees) in 2005 Revenues 
in 2005 
Net Profits 
in 2005 
Antiviral Capabilities 
and markets? 
Pfizer It is headquartered in New York City and employs about 115,000 people. $52 billion $11 billion Yes, well represented 
GlaxoSmithKline 
 
It is headquartered in Brentford, UK and employed about 100,000 people. 
The company operates primarily in 116 countries and its products are sold in 
over 125 countries.  
$38 billion $8 billion Yes, strongly positioned 
Merck & 
Company 
The company is headquartered in the USA and employs about 63,000 
people.  
$23 billion $6 billion Yes, strong presence 
AstraZeneca 
 
It is headquartered in London, the UK and employed about 60,000 
employees  
$21 billion $4 billion no 
Sanofi-Aventis 
Group 
It is headquartered in Paris, France and employs about 96,400 people.  $19 billion $7 billion no 
Novartis 
 
Novartis is a global biopharmaceutical company that is headquartered in 
Switzerland. Novartis employed 115 000 people or associates in 140 
countries in 2005  
$29 billion $7 billion limited 
 
 
